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We investigate the win-lose relations between strategies of iterated prisoner’s dilemma games 
by using a directed network concept to display the replicator dynamics results. In the giant 
strongly-connected component of the win/lose network, we find win-lose circulations similar to 
rock-paper-scissors and analyze the fixed point and its stability. Applying the network motif 
concept, we introduce dynamic motifs, which describe the population dynamics relations among 
the three strategies. Through exact enumeration, we find 22 dynamic motifs and display their 
phase portraits. Visualization using directed networks and motif analysis is a useful method to 
make complex dynamic behavior simple in order to understand it more intuitively. Dynamic 
motifs can be building blocks for dynamic behavior among strategies when they are applied to 
other types of games. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma is well-known in game theory as a scenario that shows how two “rational” 
individuals may not cooperate, even though doing so would be to their benefit [1–3]. The story starts 
from a situation where two criminals are arrested and imprisoned. They have no way to talk to each 
other because they are in solitary confinement. The prosecutor offers each one a deal separately: If one 
confesses and the other denies the crime, the confessor will be set free, and the other will serve five 
years in prison. If both deny the crime and keep silent, they will each serve two years in prison. If both 
confess, each will serve four years in prison. The question then becomes what the choice of a rational 
person would be. Before we consider an individual’s choice, let us think about the total punishment by 
summing both sentences. If the prisoners deny their guilt and keep silent, the total sentence is four 
years, but it is eight years if both confess, and five years if they choose different decisions. Therefore, 
the global optimum is for both prisoners to deny their guilt if we consider the total amount of 
punishment. However, from an individual viewpoint, it is always better to confess regardless of the 
partner’s choice. Therefore, they will finally get an eight-year sentence in total even though it is the 
worst choice when the total amount of punishment is considered. Therefore, this is called the prisoner’s 
dilemma. The local (individual) optimization ends up with the worst result through global (total 
sentence) optimization [3, 4]. 
However, repeating this game can have a different outcome from a single-round game because 
lessons toward mutual cooperation are learned. This version is called the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
game (IPDG) [3, 5–7]. There are three famous cooperating strategies in the IPDG: One is the “grim 
trigger” (GT) who cooperates at first, but betrays or defects forever after the opponent’s single 
defection [8]. The second is the “tit-for-tat” (TFT), which literally does what the opponent did after 
initial cooperation [1–3]. The last is the “Pavlov.” This strategy keeps the last decision if the result was 
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good, but otherwise switches to a different decision. Therefore, this is also called the “win-stay, lose-
switch” strategy [9]. These three strategies sound reasonable; moreover, they are very simple as they 
are based only on the previous decision, which means a single-step memory is sufficient to apply these 
strategies. The one-step memory size IPDG has 32 strategies, and their evolutionary dynamics are 
described by 32 first-order nonlinear differential equations. However, the relations among these 32 
strategies are not fully understood [6, 7]. 
In this paper, we study the relations between the strategies of the IPDG with a one-step memory size 
by using a directed network concept to display the replicator dynamics results. The directed network 
concept is useful for providing a graphical representation of the relations among the strategies, which 
provides an understanding of the dynamics between the two strategies and an intuition for more 
complicated dynamics between all the available strategies. In Section II, we introduce the IPDG with   
25 single-memory, non-duplicated strategies and replicator dynamics (RD). How the win-lose directed 
network is constructed is explained, and an analysis of the dynamic motifs is given. Section III shows 
the resulting win-lose network and the win-lose circulations. The results of RD among the three 
strategies are analyzed, and 22 existent dynamic motifs are displayed. In the last section, summaries 
and discussions are included. 
 
II. METHODS 
 
In prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games, if two players cooperate (denoted by “C”) with each other, they 
get a payoff “R” as a reward. However, if one defects (denoted by “D”) while the other cooperates, the 
defector receives a payoff “T” meaning a temptation, and the opponent gets a payoff “S,” meaning a 
sucker’s payoff. If both players defect, they receive a payoff “P” as a punishment. Each payoff must 
satisfy the conditions T > R > P > S  and 2R > T + S  for the game to be a PD game [1–3]. We 
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summarize the payoff matrix in Table 1.  
When the game is repeated, various strategies are possible as player’s reactions against the 
opponent’s past actions if the player remembers the past. For example, if the player remembers only the 
previous action of the opponent, the player is able to react in 4 (= 22) ways, C or D, the two ways for 
the partner’s C and the other two ways for D. If we consider a cold start when no record is possible as 
it is the first move, the number of possible reactions is 8 (= 23).  In a similar way, if we also consider 
the previous action of the player along with the opponent’s action, the total number of possible 
strategies is 32 (= 25) for mutual cooperation between the player and the opponent (denoted as |CC|). 
In the same way, |CD| represents a player cooperating but the opponent defecting. Likewise, |DC| and 
|DD| are denoted. If a convenient bitwise representation is used for these 32 cases, each strategy can be 
represented by using a five-bit binary system 𝑎0|𝑎1𝑎2𝑎3𝑎4, where the first bit 𝑎0 is the first move of 
the cold start, and the 𝑎1𝑎2𝑎3𝑎4  represents the reactions for the states |CC|, |CD|, |DC|, and |DD|, 
respectively [6, 7]. The 32 possible strategies in the IPDG are summarized in Table 2. A decimal 
number is assigned for each strategy by interpreting the binary notation C and D as 1(2) and 0(2). For 
example, the 0th strategy, which corresponds to 00000(2) (𝑎4𝑎3𝑎2𝑎1𝑎0), means D|DDDD, i.e., always 
defeat. The 11th strategy, which is called “tit for tat” (TFT), is 01011(2) representing C|CDCD; first 
cooperate, then react as the opponent did. Even though possible representations can be done in 32 ways,  
seven strategies are effectively the same, and only 25 strategies are non-duplicated where stochastic 
noises, like mutation and simple mistakes, are ignored [7]. In this study, we consider only the 25 
strategies. The seven other unused strategies are marked in red in Table 2. 
 
1. Evolutionary Replicator Dynamics 
Replicator dynamics (RD) is a widely used method in  game theory to find an evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS) [3, 10, 11]. The population density of strategy 𝑖 is denoted by 𝑥𝑖, and its time derivative 
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?̇?𝑖  is given by ?̇?𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖�𝑓𝑖(?⃗?) − 𝑓(̅?⃗?)�, where 𝑓𝑖(?⃗?) is the fitness of strategy 𝑖 for a given population 
distribution ?⃗?  , and the mean fitness is  𝑓(̅?⃗?) = ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑓𝑗(?⃗?)𝑛𝑗=1 . The fitness of a certain strategy is 
calculated by using 𝑓𝑖(?⃗?) = ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 , where 𝑃𝑖𝑗 is the average payoff of strategy i from strategy j per 
round when the two strategies are used in the IPDG [6, 7]. The average payoff matrix of strategy 𝐏 is a 
25 by 25 asymmetric matrix [7]. 
When two individuals play the IPDG by using their own strategies with a memory size of one, there 
are only four states |CC|, |CD|, |DC|, and |DD| [6, 7]. As an example, let us consider when a player 
makes use of strategy No. 11, TFT, and the opponent plays strategy No. 21, tree frog, as shown in 
Table 2. The two players’ state starts from |CC|, i.e., both cooperate, then moves to |CD|, subsequently 
following their own strategies. Then, |DD| and |DC| follow, and their states return to |CC|, as shown in 
Fig. 1(a). They repeat this sequence in period-four like a recurrent state. For one period, the TFT player 
receives the payoff sum of R, S, P, and T while the opponent, tree frog, gets the sum of R, T, P, and S. 
As another example, when strategy No. 3, grim trigger, meets strategy No. 24, CD repeater, the state 
enters a period-two recurrent state, |DC|↔|DD|, and after the transient states |CC|→|CD|, as shown in 
Fig. 1(b). Because the possible periods are two, three, or four, the rounds of their least common 
multiple, 12, are sufficient to calculate the average payoff between the two strategies after several 
transient periods have been discarded. In this study, we use a payoff matrix with T = 5, R = 3, P =1, and S = 0, which is a typical one and satisfies the Pareto efficiency conditions [3, 5–7]. In our 
simulation, we use the first-order Euler method to solve the differential equation with a time step dt = 0.01, and we have checked that this time step size is precise enough for this numerical integration 
because the effective potential of this system is not stiff at all. 
 
2. RD of One-to-one Matches among the Strategies 
With the 25 non-duplicated strategies, we enumerate all possible one-to-one matches, which totals 
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300 = �252 � combinations. The equations of RD for two strategies are only the two coupled non-linear 
differential equations. Combining these with the population conservation condition, it becomes a one-
variable nonlinear (cubic) differential equation. One can easily find the fixed points and their stabilities 
[7, 12]. The RD results belong to four cases as shown in Fig. 2: (a) 189 win/lose directed links, (b) 3 
unstable links, (c) 40 stable links, and (d) 68 neutral constant links. Among them, only the win/lose 
overwhelmed case, which is 63% of the matches, is independent of the initial conditions.  
 
3. Win/lose Directed Network and Dynamic Motifs 
In order to simplify and intuitively understand the competitive relations among the strategies of 
IPDG, we construct win/lose directed networks by using only the 189 win/lose directed links. From this 
directed network, we find a giant strongly-connected component (GSCC), which consists of 10 
strategies. The GSCC in the directed networks naturally means the existence of directed loops 
(circulation). In this win/lose network, the loop is a win/lose circulation, such as rock-paper-scissors. 
One can find win/lose circulations among several strategies, including the smallest three in the GSCC. 
We analyze the smallest win/lose circulation and its stability. Extending the analysis, we enumerate all 
possible 2300 =  �253 �  combinations among the three strategies and analyze their fixed points and 
stabilities, i.e., their phase portraits. According to network theory terminology, the simple building 
block among the three nodes in complex networks is called a “network motif” [13]. Because we 
consider four different types of links and their dynamic characteristics, it is the dynamic motif among 
the three strategies. These analyses of the building block, i.e., the dynamic motif, among the strategies 
in game theory help us to understand more intuitively the riches of dynamic behaviors and the interplay 
among them. 
 
III. RESULTS 
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1. Bow-tie Structure of the Win/Lose Directed Network 
Incorporating the 189 win/lose directed links, we construct a win/lose directed network among the 
25 strategies, as shown in Fig. 3. The GSCC has 10 strategies. On the left side of the GSCC, 9 
strategies are the in-components, and the 6 on the right are the out-components. Because the direction 
of the link, for example, heading from A to B, represents the strategy, B overwhelms A. The strategies 
in the out-components are the superior ones in the IPDG. In this network, the grim trigger and the TFT 
are on the right end, which means that they are the most dominant strategies in the IPDG for a given 
payoff [6, 7]. In the enlarged inset of Fig. 3, one finds the win/lose circulations where the simplest one 
consists of three strategies such as the rock-paper-scissors. All the smallest win/lose circulations with 
three strategies always contain strategy No. 5, where cooperation occurs only when the previous choice 
is C and the opponent’s is D; otherwise, it is always defeated [7].  
 
2. Win/Lose Circulation and Stability Analysis 
For a more precise analysis of these win/lose circulations, in the sense of RD, we chose two sets of 
three strategies. The first one was {5, 22, 28}, and the other was {5, 18, 17} according to the direction 
(see Fig. 4). The results of RD showed that the first set {5, 22, 28} had an evolutionarily stable strategy 
(ESS), i.e., a fixed point at (0.13, 0.39, 0.48) in configuration space [Fig. 4(a)]. All the realizations that 
start from the vicinity of the three corners converge on a fixed point as time evolves. On the other hand, 
the other set {5, 18, 17} always diverges rotating around the point at (0.11, 0.23, 0.66), i.e., anti-ESS; in 
other words, the point is an unstable fixed point. As time goes by, the period of oscillation grows 
exponentially, and the point is expelled to the boundary.  
For the three strategies, the RD equations are just three nonlinear differential equations and are 
reducible to two nonlinear differential equations with the population conservation condition, 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 +
𝑥3 = 1. If there are fixed points within the range 0 < 𝑥𝑖 < 1, the steady-state condition gives ?̇?1 =
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?̇?2 = ?̇?3 = 0 and 𝑓1 = 𝑓2 = 𝑓3 = 𝑓.̅ Then, one can obtain the condition with the average payoff matrix 
of the 𝐏 strategies as follows: 
�
𝑓1
𝑓2
𝑓3
� = �𝑃11 𝑃12 𝑃13𝑃21 𝑃22 𝑃23
𝑃31 𝑃32 𝑃33
��
𝑥1
∗
𝑥2
∗
𝑥3
∗
� = �𝑓̅𝑓̅
𝑓̅
�;     (1) 
i.e., 𝐏?⃗?∗ = 𝑓?̅?, where 𝟏 is the column vector of ones and ?⃗?∗ is the fixed point. By applying the inverse 
matrix of the average payoff matrix 𝐏, one can get the fixed point. For the cases of Fig. 4, the results of 
the numerical integration agree with the analytical solutions. The stability and the abstract of the phase 
portrait can be analyzed with the determinant and trace of the Jacobian matrix of the RD equations [12]. 
The examples in Fig. 4 correspond to a stable spiral [Fig. 4(a)] and an unstable spiral [Fig. 4(b)], 
respectively.  
 
3. Network Motifs and Dynamic Motifs 
Extending the concept of win/lose circulations, we enumerate all possible types of relations among 
the three strategies. For example, the cases in Fig. 4 have relations of A wins B, B wins C, and C wins 
A. Reading the relation starting from the top of the triangle counterclockwise, it is  Win-Win-Win 
denoting the relations as “WWW.” Similarly, we encode in three-character words the relation “W (L)” 
for win (lose), “S (U)” for stable (unstable), and “N” for the neutral constancy links in Fig. 2. The five 
types of relations (links) when the counterclockwise reading direction is considered, give 30 different 
network motifs in theory. However, for the strategies of the IPDG with a given payoff matrix, only 22 
types of motifs among 30 appear [13]. All 22 existent dynamic motifs are summarized in Table 3 with 
their frequencies. The total combinations of choosing 3 from 25 is 2300 =  �253 �. The most frequent 
motif “WWL” appears 547 times among the 2300 (23.8%), which corresponds to a situation in which 
there is one superior strategy. The win/lose circulation WWW quite rare happening only 4 times. 
Because the neutral constancy link is quite abundant (68/300 = 0.23), NNN is not very rare (74 times, 
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3.2%) compared to WWW. 
For these 22 types of dynamic motifs, we analyze the existence of fixed points within the range of 
configuration space and phase portrait that describes the dynamic behaviors. On some occasions, even 
the motif notation is the same; the dynamics behavior is totally different as in the example in Fig. 4. All 
the existent dynamic motifs are displayed in Fig. 5. The directions of the flows are represented by black 
arrows, and the velocities are visualized with a range of colors from purple (slow) to red (fast). If there 
are fixed points, they are denoted by the red-filled symbol. The phase portraits of some dynamic motifs 
contain a stable fixed point inside the configuration space. Here, we ignore trivial cases on the edges 
where at least one population is zero. 
 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We investigated the relations between the strategies of iterated prisoner’s dilemma games (IPDG) by 
using a directed network to display the results of replicator dynamics. By incorporating the win/lose 
relation between strategies, a win/lose network is constructed adapting a directed network concept. 
From the analysis of the giant strongly-connected component, we find win/lose circulations like the 
rock-paper-scissors game and analyze the fixed point and its stability by applying a nonlinear dynamics 
analysis. Extending the network motif concept in directed networks, we introduce dynamic motifs, 
which describe the relations among the three strategies and the dynamic behaviors in the population 
configuration space. The five types of relations, two directed and three undirected, between two 
strategies generate 30 possible dynamic motifs. Among them, only 22 dynamic motifs appear in the 
IPDG with a given payoff matrix and a limited memory size. Visualization using directed networks and 
its motif analysis is a useful method to make the complex dynamic behaviors among the strategies 
simple so that the dynamics can be intuitively understood. This is achieved even when starting from the 
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countless possibilities of the initial conditions. The dynamic motifs are the building blocks for 
understanding the dynamic behaviors of the strategies, just as network motifs are in complex networks. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
We would like to thank Pan-Jun Kim and Seung Ki Baek for helpful comments and discussions. This 
work was supported by a National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Ministry 
of Science, ICT & Future Planning (No. 2012R1A1A1012150).  
 
REFERENCES 
[1]  R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation  (Basic Books, New York, 1984). 
[2]  R. Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-based Models of Competition and 
Collaboration  (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997). 
[3]  G. Szabo and G. Fath, Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007). 
[4]  J. Nash, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 36, 48 (1950). 
[5]  R. Axelrod and W. D. Hamilton, Science 211, 1390 (1981). 
[6]  S. K. Baek and B. J. Kim, Phys. Rev. E 78, 011125 (2008). 
[7]  Y. J. Kim, M. Roh, and S.-W. Son, J. Korean Phys. Soc. 64, 341 (2014). 
[8]  J. W. Friedman, Rev. Econ. Stud. 38, 1 (1971). 
[9]  D. Kraines and V. Kraines, Theory Decis. 26, 47 (1989). 
[10]  J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1998). 
[11]  J. M. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995). 
[12]  S. H. Strogatz, Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos (Westview Press, Cambridge, 2000). 
[13]  R. Milo, S. Shen-Orr, S. Itzkoviz, N. Kashtan, D. Chklovskii, and U. Alon, Science 298, 824 
 10 
(2002). 
  
 11 
Tables 
 
 
Table  1. Payoff matrix for the player (opponent) in a PD game. 
 Opponent 
C D 
Player 
C R ( R ) S ( T ) 
D T ( S ) P ( P ) 
 
 
Table  2. (Color online) Summary of the 32 strategies. The duplicated strategies are marked in red. 
Strategy 
number 
Bitwise 
representation Nickname 
Strategy 
number 
Bitwise 
representation Nickname 
0 D|DDDD All D 16 D|DDDC  
1 C|DDDD All D FC 17 C|DDDC  
2 D|CDDD All D 18 D|CDDC Pavlov FD 
3 C|CDDD Grim trigger 19 C|CDDC Pavlov 
4 D|DCDD All D 20 D|DCDC Tree frog FD 
5 C|DCDD  21 C|DCDC Tree frog 
6 D|CCDD All D 22 D|CCDC Prodigal son 
7 C|CCDD All C 23 C|CCDC All C 
8 D|DDCD Swindler FD 24 D|DDCC CD repeater 
9 C|DDCD Swindler 25 C|DDCC DC repeater 
10 D|CDCD Tit for tat FD 26 D|CDCC Punisher FD 
11 C|CDCD Tit for tat 27 C|CDCC Punisher 
12 D|DCCD  28 D|DCCC Rebel FD 
13 C|DCCD  29 C|DCCC Rebel 
14 D|CCCD Blinder 30 D|CCCC All C FD 
15 C|CCCD All C 31 C|CCCC All C 
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Table  3. All 22 of the existent dynamic motifs and their frequencies and percentages. 
rank motif frequency 
Percentage
(%) 
rank motif frequency 
Percentage
(%) 
1 WWL 547 23.8 12 NLS 40 1.7 
2 LWN 333 14.5 13 WLU 29 1.3 
3 WWN 253 11.0 14 SSS 17 0.7 
4 WLN 252 11.0 15 NNS 17 0.7 
5 LWS 231 10.0 16 NNU 13 0.6 
6 NWS 177 7.7 17 WWU 12 0.5 
7 SSN 95 4.1 18 LWU 7 0.3 
8 SSW 84 3.7 19 WWW 4 0.2 
9 NNN 74 3.2 20 NWU 3 0.1 
10 NNW 63 2.7 21 UUN 2 0.1 
11 WWS 46 2.0 22 NLU 1 0.0 
 
  
 13 
 
Figures & Figure Captions 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. State transition graph between two strategies. (a) TFT versus “Tree frog” has no transient state 
and there are four periods. (b) GT versus “CD repeater” has transient states before entering the period-
two recurrent state. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. (Color online) Four possible cases of replicator dynamics for one-to-one matches: (a) win/lose, 
(b) unstable, (c) stable, and (d) constant cases. The stable and the unstable fixed points are marked in 
red-filled and white-unfilled symbols, respectively. 
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Fig. 3. (Color online) Bow-tie network structure and the giant strongly-connected component. The 
bow-tie structure shows that the strategies on the left side are the out-components with “lose” 
connections, and the strategies on the right side are the in-components with “win” connections. There 
are 10 strategies in the giant strongly-connected component (GSCC). In the GSCC, we find a win-lose 
circulation among the strategies. 
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 Fig. 4. (Color online) Evolution dynamics in the win-lose circulation: (a) stable (ESS) and (b) unstable 
fixed point (anti-ESS). Red indicates the early step, and blue is the later one. For (a), three different 
initial states, (0.98, 0.01, 0.01), (0.01, 0.98, 0.01), and (0.01, 0.01, 0.98), are used. For (b), the 
simulation starts from the vicinity of the unstable fixed point.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
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Fig. 5. (Color online) All possible dynamic results of the motifs among the three strategies. The stable 
fixed points are marked by red-filled circles, and the velocities are represented as shown in the top right; 
reddish is fast, bluish is slow, and purple indicates almost stopped. 
